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COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY IN THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA: THE CHANCES FOR SUCCESSFUL
PROSECUTION*
I. INTRODUCTION
On 22 February 1993, the United Nations Security Council
passed Resolution 808 calling for the establishment of an inter-
national tribunal for the prosecution of persons responsible for
"serious violations of international humanitarian law committed
in the territory of former Yugoslavia."' The resolution also
asked the Secretary-General to submit to the Security Council
for consideration a report on aspects of the tribunal considering
"suggestions put forward in this regard by Member states."2 In
May, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali issued his report
and proposed the Statute of the International Tribunal
("Statute"),3 designed to govern the tribunars establishment
and operation.4
In addition to establishing the tribunal's legal foundations
and organizational structure, the Secretary-General outlined the
principles comprising its competence. Specifically covered were
its subject-matter, personal, territorial, and temporal jurisdic-
tions.5 The Secretary-General, in the notes accompanying Arti-
cle 7 of the proposed Statute, addressing individual criminal
responsibility, stated that a military commander should:
* This article won the 1994 Walter Scott McNeill Legal Writing Competition
and the decision to include it in this issue was made by the Editor-in-Chief.
1. S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/808
(1993).
2. Id. at para. 2.
3. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council
Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993) reprinted in 32 I.L.M.
1159 (1993) [hereinafter Report of the Secretary-General].
4. For a more in-depth discussion on aspects of the tribunal see Report on the
International Tribunal to Adjudicate War Crimes Committed in the Former Yugosla-
via, 1993 A.B.. Int'l Law Section.
5. Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 3, at 1169.
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be held responsible for failure to prevent a crime or to deter
the unlawful behavior of his subordinates. This imputed
responsibility or criminal negligence is engaged if the per-
son in superior authority knew or had reason to know that
his subordinates were about to commit or had committed
crimes and yet failed to take the necessary and reasonable
steps to prevent or repress the commission of such crimes
or to punish those who had committed them.6
The Security Council by Resolution 827 adopted the Secretary-
General's proposal.7 This Note will examine the chances for
successful prosecution under Article 7, paragraph 3 of the Stat-
ute. That paragraph provides that superiors will be held respon-
sible for the illegal acts committed by their subordinates if the
superiors (1) knew or had reason to know that such acts were
about to be committed and initiated no preventive action or, (2)
were committed and took no measures to prevent their repeti-
tion. This is the doctrine of command responsibility.
As Article 7, paragraph 3 provides, a successful prosecution
based on command responsibility requires proof of two ele-
ments. The first can be characterized as the knowledge element
and the second as the lack of action element. Historically, con-
victions predicated on this doctrine have pivoted on the applica-
tion of the first element as numerous courts have grappled with
the degree of knowledge required. Is it enough to prove that
accused commanders should have known of the atrocities being
committed by their subordinates or must actual knowledge be
proven? There have been as many different answers to this
question as there have been courts addressing the issue. Ac-
cordingly, it is crucial to the prosecution of alleged war crimi-
nals in the former Yugoslavia to understand exactly what is
meant by the "knew or had reason to know" language of Article
7, paragraph 3. This Note will attempt to answer the knowl-
edge question through an analysis of the numerous cases and
debates which have addressed the command responsibility doc-
trine.
6. Id. at 1175.
7. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(1993).
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In addition, this Note will trace the evolution of the doctrine
from its inception in the Yamashita case through the
Nuremberg trials and the My Lai courts martial. It will high-
light not only the changes the doctrine has undergone, but also
its gradual acceptance as a legitimate facet of international
humanitarian law. This Note will also devote special attention
to the numerous international conventions which have attempt-
ed to establish rules governing how states conduct themselves
in times of war and their impact on the doctrine. This Note's
main purpose, however, is to detail the current operation of
command responsibility and to outline for potential prosecutors
its appropriateness to the situation in the territory that was
once Yugoslavia.
The principles underlying command responsibility have exist-
ed for centuries.8 The first international prosecution under this
doctrine, however, occurred in response to atrocities committed
by Japanese soldiers as American forces recaptured the Philip-
pine Islands at the end of the Second World War.9 Japanese
soldiers, primarily those of the 14th Area Army, were accused
of intentionally, and at times methodically, killing tens of thou-
sands of Filipinos and American POW's. A U.S. military com-
mission tried and convicted the supreme Japanese commander
in the Philippines, General Tomoyuki Yamashita. Following a
review of the commission's decision by a board of review creat-
ed by General Douglas MacArthur, Yamashita was hanged. It is
essential to note that he was not charged with ordering any il-
8. For example, in 190 B.C., Roman commander Aemilius Regillus successfully
besieged the Greek city, Phocaea. In exchange for guaranteeing the safety of the city,
Regillus accepted its surrender. Regillus's troops, however, despite contrary orders,
sacked the city. Upon regaining control of his army, Regillus "punished those chiefly
at fault, restored the freedom, lands, and goods of those victims whose lives [he] had
been able to preserve, and offered public atonement for the deeds."
PETER KARSTEN, LAw, SOLDIERS, AND COmAT at xiii (1978).
9. Hints of the doctrine, however, arose in response to atrocities committed dur-
ing the First World War. In March 1919, in Versailles, the "Commission on the Re-
sponsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties" recommended
that the German ex-Kaiser be tried as a war criminal because he and others in high
authority "were cognizant of and could at least have mitigated the barbarities com-
mitted during the course of the war. A word from them would have brought about a
different method in the action of their subordinates on land, at sea and in the air."
See Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference, in 1 THE LAW OF WAR: A
DOcUMENTARY HISTORY 842, 853-54 (Leon Friedman ed., 1972).
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legal acts but with failing to exercise the proper control over
his troops such to prevent them.
The doctrine resurfaced shortly thereafter during the
Nuremberg trials. In the High Command Case and the Hostage
Case senior German officers were charged with neglecting their
responsibilities as military commanders and as a result hun-
dreds of thousands of people were killed by troops under their
command. In the High Command Case, General Field Marshal
Wilhelm von Leeb was held to have not violated his responsibil-
ities as a military commander as the tribunal hearing the case
required that General von Leeb actually be aware of the
atrocities being committed by his troops-a burden the prosecu-
tion could not meet. In the Hostage Case, General Field Mar-
shal Wilhelm List's contention that he was unaware of the
atrocities being committed by subordinate troops was rejected
because of the reports of atrocities that reached his headquar-
ters.
Later, when American troops unlawfully killed the inhabit-
ants of a small Vietnamese hamlet questions were raised as to
how high up the chain of command responsibility should go.
U.S. Army prosecutors, however, like the ones in the High
Command Case, failed to secure a conviction because they could
not conclusively establish that Captain Ernest Medina was
aware of the massacre in time to stop it. The doctrine was
finally codified by the 1977 Protocol supplementing the four
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.0
II. THE CASE OF GENERAL YAMASHITA
A. Factual Background
In the Spring of 1945, American troops invaded the main
Philippine island of Luzon. This followed the successful attack
10. The 1977 Protocol supplemented: (1) the Geneva Convention for the Ameliora-
tion of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of 12
August 1949; (2) the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Ship-wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of 12 August
1949; (3) the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12
August 1949; and (4) the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949. See 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1397 (1977).
[Vol. 29:191
COMMDAND RESPONSIBILITY
at Leyte, fulfilling General Douglas MacArthur's two-year-old
promise to retake the Philippines from Japan."
As American troops advanced on Manila, rumors spread that
retreating Japanese soldiers were killing, in tremendous num-
bers, both Filipino citizens and American POW's. The killings,
it was reported, were systematic and orderly. One hundred
thousand Filipinos were killed in the fight for Manila alone. 2
Blame for the atrocities quickly fell on the Japanese Supreme
Commander in the Philippines, General Tomoyuki Yamashita.
He commanded Japan's main fighting force on the island, the
14th Area Army, from October of 1944 until its surrender in
the fall of 1945.1" Upon gaining full control of the Philippines,
an incensed General MacArthur created a special committee,
the War Crimes Branch, to look into the allegations. The com-
mittee, headed by Colonel Alva Carpenter, formulated the rules
and procedures that would govern the trial of General
Yamashita before a military commission. 4
A conference in Manila was convened on 14 September 1945
by MacArthur's deputy chief of staff, Major General R.J. Mar-
shall. 5 Joining Marshall were Carpenter and his staff as well
as members of MacArthur's military intelligence sections. In
addition, Washington sent four representatives from the newly
created U.S. War Crimes Office. 6 All agreed that General
Yamashita would be the first targeted for prosecution.
Marshall's position was that Yamashita should be tried for
failing "to exercise proper control over his troops and
[permitting] the sacking of Manila," and for "negligence in al-
lowing his subordinates to commit atrocities."'
7
11. For detailed discussions on the invasion from a U.S. perspective, see generally
ROBERT R. SMITH, THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC: TRIUMPH IN THE PHILIPPINES (1963);
SAMUEL E. MORISON, THE LIBERATION OF THE PHILIPPINES: LUZON, MINDANAO, AND
THE VISAYAS (1959). For a Japanese perspective see generally RICHARD L. LAEL, THE
YAMASHITA PRECEDENT: WAR CRIMES AND COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY (1982).
12. SMITH, supra note 11, at 307.
13. See id. at 88.
14. See LAEL, supra note 11, at 64-65.
15. See id. at 67.
16. Secretary of War Henry Stimson in September of 1944 ordered the creation of
the War Crimes Office "so that it could collect evidence on war crimes and coordinate
and arrange the arrest, trial, and punishment of war criminals." Id. at 66 n.25.
17. Id. at 69.
1994]
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It was noted by Marshall, however, that prosecuting
Yamashita on such a theory was without precedent. I" It had
never before been alleged that a military commander was liable
for the illegal acts of his subordinates where no evidence was
proffered to prove the commander specifically ordered his troops
to commit those illegal acts.
Though it lacked precedent, the case against Yamashita was
supported by a number of international conventions, as the U.S.
Supreme Court would later agree.19 While none of these con-
ventions specifically enumerate a doctrine of command responsi-
bility, they lend strong support to the argument that command-
ers may be called to account for the actions of their subordi-
nates. The Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 states that in
order for an armed force to be considered lawful it must "be
commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates.""
Moreover, Article 43 of that convention requires a military
commander, in possession of enemy territory, to "take all mea-
sures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible,
public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely
prevented, the laws in force in the country."21 The Tenth
Hague Convention, addressing naval warfare, provides that
naval officers "shall see to the execution of ... the general
principles of the present convention."22 The principles of that
convention compel commanders to safeguard, to the extent
possible, the well-being of those subjected to naval bombard-
ment. The Geneva Red Cross Convention of 1929 calls on "the
commanders-in-chief of the belligerent armies to provide for the
details of execution of the foregoing articles."' The articles of
that convention require commanders to follow a number of set
policies which aid in the treatment of the sick and wounded in
battle. Lastly, the Convention on Treatment of Prisoners of War
18. Id.
19. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 13-18 (1946).
20. Annex to the Fourth Hague Convention, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 1, 36 Stat. 2277,
2295.
21. Id. art. 43, 36 Stat. at 2306.
22. Adaption to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention
(Hague, X, Oct. 18, 1907), art. 19, 36 Stat. 2389.
23. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick of Armies in the Field, July 27, 1929, (also known as the Geneva Red Cross
Convention (1929)), art. 26, 47 Stat. 2074, 2092.
196 [Vol. 29:191
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of 1929 states that "[s]entence may be pronounced against a
prisoner of war only by the same courts and according to the
same procedure as in the case of persons belonging to the
armed forces of the detaining Power."24
Taken collectively these conventions create a basis for the
argument that military commanders have an affirmative re-
sponsibility to insure that those under their command act in
accordance with international legal standards. The doctrine of
command responsibility was thus born from a fusion of these
conventions' particular articles.
B. The Trial
On 8 October 1945, General Yamashita was formally
charged.' Five U.S. Army generals were assigned to hear the
case.2" The charge, composed by Colonel Carpenter, stated that
Yamashita:
unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his duty as
commander to control the operations of the members of his
command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and
other high crimes against people of the United States and
of its dependencies, particularly the Philippines, between 9
October 1944 and 2 September 1945.27
To this general charge was added a Bill of Particulars outlin-
ing 123 atrocities for which Yamashita was also allegedly per-
sonally responsible.
Major Robert Kerr led the prosecution and in presenting its
case called hundreds of eyewitnesses. All testified as to the
24. Convention on Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, art. 63, 47 Stat.
2021.
25. The case against General Yamashita is reported at length in 4 LAW REPORTS
OF THE TRIALS OF WAR CRIUNlALS, (1948) [hereinafter 4 U.N. LAW REPORTS].
26. The five were Major General Russell B. Reynolds, Major General Clarence
Sturdevant, Major General James Lester, Brigadier General William Walker, and
Brigadier General Egbert Bullene.
27. Review of the Record of Trial by a Military Commission of Tomoyuki
Yamashita, General, Imperial Japanese Army, JA 201-Yamashita, Tomoyuki, General,
Imperial Japanese Army. A.P.O. 500, 26 Dec. 1945 at 1, [hereinafter Review of the
Record] (report to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Armed Forces Pacific pre-
pared by the Pacific Theater Judge Advocate).
19941
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horrific nature of what they saw.28 The prosecution argued this
testimony alone was enough to establish that Yamashita violat-
ed his responsibilities as a commander. As Major Kerr argued,
the atrocities:
were so notorious and so flagrant and so enormous, both as
to the scope of their operation and as to the inhumanity,
the bestiality involved, that they must have been known to
the Accused if he were making any effort whatever to meet
the responsibilities of his command . .29
Essentially, the prosecution was arguing that the burden of
persuasion shifted once they showed that the atrocities were
committed on a large enough scale. With few exceptions, the
defense did not deny that the atrocities were committed. Thus,
it became the defense's burden to prove that Yamashita was
unaware of the atrocities or to assert reasons why Yamashita,
if he knew of the atrocities, should be excused from the obliga-
tions he owed as a commander of troops.
However, on the chance that the commission was not per-
suaded by this argument, the prosecution also introduced evi-
dence tending to prove General Yamashita's more direct in-
volvement in the atrocities as "distinguished from that incident
to mere command."30
On the witness stand, Yamashita admitted to ordering the
suppression of guerrillas, leaving the methods employed to the
28. The commission learned:
how Japanese soldiers executed priests in their churches ... machine-
gunned residents in their neighborhoods, and beheaded or burned alive
American prisoners of war. It learned of Japanese torture .... It learned
how one Japanese soldier tossed a baby in the air and impaled it on the
ceiling with his bayonet, and how others bayoneted an eleven-year-old
girl thirty-eight times. It learned of rape and necrophilia....
LAEL, supra note 11, at 83-84.
It also heard testimony that Japanese soldiers were often in intoxicated rages and as
a result "men's bodies were hung in the air and mutilated; babies' eyeballs were
ripped out and smeared across walls; patients were tied down to their beds and then
the hospital burned to the ground." LAWRENCE TAYLOR, A TRIAL OF GENERALS 125
(1981).
29. LAEL, supra note 11, at 83 (quoting AG 000.5 (9-24-45) JA Before the Military
Commission Convened by the Commanding General United States Army Forces, West-
ern Pacific: Yamashita, Tomoyuki, at 31).
30. Review of the Record, supra note 27, at 9.
[Vol. 29:191
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discretion of the individual commanders."' It was widely ac-
cepted that a substantial number of the atrocities were commit-
ted in a putative attempt to control Filipino guerrilla activity.
To support the argument that Yamashita's order to suppress
guerrillas directly resulted in atrocities, the prosecution relied
in part on the testimony of one of Yamashita's subordinate
officers. Colonel Hideo Nishiharu, in command of the 14th Area
Army's police force, the Kempei Tai, testified that he told Gen-
eral Yamashita that there was no time to try suspected guerril-
las. 2 He stated that the Kempei Tai would "punish those who
were to be punished."" Nishiharu asserted Yamashita bowed
his head in silent approval and, accordingly, during ten days in
December 1945 over 600 persons in Manila were summarily
executed.
In addition, numerous captured documents were introduced
revealing that in many instances the order to kill came from
high in the chain of command. The diary of one officer read:
"rleceived orders, on the mopping up of guerrillas ... it seems
that all men are to be killed .... Our object is to wound and
kill the men [and] ... to kill women who run away."34 Cap-
tured orders from Colonel Masatochi Fujishige expressed that
Japanese soldiers were to "[kMill American troops cruelly. Do
not kill them with one stroke. Shoot guerrillas. Kill all who
oppose the emperor, even women and children." 5
31. 4 U.N. LAW REPORTS, supra note 25, at 22.
32. Id. at 19-20.
33. Review of the Record, supra note 27, at 10.
34. Id. The text of a number of illegal orders have been included in their entirety
throughout this Note to signify the differences between illegal orders and a
commander's failure to act. They have also been included to show their impact on the
prosecution.
35. Id. Lastly, the prosecution presented the testimony of two brothers, Narciso
Lapus and Joaquin Galang, both suspected of collaborating with the Japanese. 4 U.N.
LAW REPORTS, supra note 25, at 19. Lapus, the private secretary to General Artemio
Ricarte, a major Filipino puppet of the Japanese, testified that Ricarte was given
orders by Yamashita to "wipeg out" the whole population of Manila. Review of the
Record, supra note 27, at 10-11. Galang testified that he overheard, and had trans-
lated for him, a conversation between Ricarte and Yamashita where Yamashita re-
fused to rescind an order to kill all Filipinos. Cross examination, however, revealed
considerable contradictions in their testimony. 4 U.N. LAW REPORTS, supra note 25, at
19-21. Moreover, the defense argued the testimony was only given in the hopes that
the brothers, held by the U.S. for collaboration, would receive favorable treatment.
The brothers were so discredited that the prosecution did not even mention them in
its closing arguments. Id. at 28-33.
1994] 199
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For the prosecution this evidence established a direct link
between the atrocities and a dereliction of Yamashita's respon-
sibilities as a military commander. They argued that the viola-
tions of the law of war committed by Yamashita's troops were:
(1) so extensive in number and dramatic in scope that they
must have been wilfully permitted by the accused or (2) were
secretly ordered by him. Accordingly, the testimony of the hun-
dreds of eyewitnesses established the first argument while the
testimony of Yamashita and the lesser officers, as well as the
captured documents, suggested the latter.
Yamashita's defense attempted to sever the connections sug-
gested by the prosecution between the accused and the atroci-
ties.36 To this end, the defense put forward two arguments.
First, due to battle conditions and the distance in command
between Yamashita and those directly responsible, he was com-
pletely ignorant of the atrocities. This first argument rebutted
the prosecution's assertion that Yamashita was aware of the
atrocities and by failing to prevent them was guilty of a viola-
tion of his command obligations. Yamashita's second argument
was that the atrocities, when committed, were contrary to his
stated orders and wishes. This refuted the prosecution's evi-
dence which linked Yamashita directly to the atrocities.
Yamashita's lack of knowledge was supported by three asser-
tions. First, he claimed that time constraints afforded him no
time to consolidate his command. On the stand Yamashita
testified that only nine days passed between his assumption of
command in the Philippines and the American invasion at
Leyte. This brief period afforded Yamashita insufficient time to
unify his command. Moreover, Yamashita claimed that the
soldiers he commanded were "inferior troops, and there simply
was not enough time to bring them up to [his] expectations.""7
36. Assigned to Yamashita's defense were Colonel Harry Clarke, Lieutenant Colo-
nel Walter Hendrix, Lieutenant Colonel James Feldhaus, Major George F. Guy, Cap-
tain A. Frank Reel, and Captain Milton Sandberg. It is clear, as Yamashita himself
acknowledged, that the defense was superbly conducted. Also, Yamashita was allowed
to have his former Chief-of-Staff, Lieutenant-General Akira Muto, and Deputy Chief-
of-Staff, Major-General Naokata Utsunomiya, aid him in his defense. For more de-
tailed accounts of the defense's strategies as well as criticisms of the Commission, see
A. FRANK REEL, THE CASE OF GENERAL YAMASHITA (1949); George F. Guy, The De-
fense of Yamashita, 4 WYo. L.J. 153 (1950).
37. REEL, supra note 36, at 149.
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Also, because Yamashita was so consumed with planning for
the defense of Leyte and Luzon, he was unable to make person-
al inspections.38
Secondly, there was the issue of battle conditions and
Yamashita's inability to maintain a command from which to
fully oversee all operations. Yamashita claimed that he was
"constantly under attack by large American forces."39 He was
becoming entrapped on the island. Japanese positions were
pounded continually by American planes and Japanese supply
ships were routinely sunk as U.S. forces began to take control
of the Pacific. Integrated communications collapsed and inter-
course between the Japanese forces became extremely difficult.
Yamashita testified that the communication systems in place
had become "completely disrupted."'
Thirdly, at the time the atrocities were committed Japanese
soldiers were scattered about the island and command had
become decentralized. Considering his dire military situation,
Yamashita realized that complete control of all his troops was
impossible and, therefore, divided them in an attempt to avoid
the wholesale destruction of his army.4' The army was divided
into three separate fighting groups.4" Separated, the army
could occupy the mountainous regions of Luzon and protract the
fighting until the military situation changed in Japan's favor.
Yamashita, himself, commanded the Shobu Group (152,000
soldiers) and defended the mountains north of Manila. Lieuten-
ant General Shizuo Yokoyama commanded the Shimbu Group
(80,000 soldiers) and defended the mountains south and east of
Manila. Lastly, Major General Rikichi Tsukada commanded the
Kembu Group (30,000 soldiers) and defended the Bataan Penin-
sula.' Because communication between the groups was not
feasible, each commander was given virtual military autono-
my" and told to prepare for "self-sufficiency [and] independent
fighting."45 Defense counsel argued that the vast number of
38. Id. at 148-49.
39. Id. at 148.
40. Id. at 148-49.
41. LAEL, supra note 11, at 12-14.
42. See SMITH, supra note 11, at 12-13, 94-97.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 87.
45. LAEL, supra note 11, at 13 (quoting CMH Translations, Outline for Operation-
2011994]
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atrocities were committed by troops in the two groups no longer
controlled by Yamashita.4"
To illustrate this point, the defense discussed with particu-
larity the atrocities committed in Manila. Prior to splitting his
army, Yamashita decided not to defend the city. Superior Amer-
ican air and naval power would have meant certain defeat and
the one million inhabitants of the city would have "over-taxed"
Japanese defenders." Therefore, prior to leading his group into
the mountains, Yamashita ordered Yokoyama to direct the evac-
uation of Japanese troops from Manila. Yokoyama claimed that
he in turn, ordered Colonel Masatocki Fujishige to supervise
the evacuation. Yokoyama claimed that he gave Fujishige the
same autonomy that had been given to him by Yamashita.
Fujishige testified that it was his orders which resulted in the
deaths in Manila and that he never informed Yokoyama or
Yamashita of the atrocities.'
Yamashita did not rest his defense solely on the impossibility
of controlling his troops. He also claimed that he had expressly
ordered fair treatment of the Filipino people within the ambit
of his forces. Yamashita testified:
[clertain testimony has been given that I ordered the mas-
sacre of all the Filipinos, and I wish to say that I absolute-
ly did not order this, nor did I receive the order to do this
from any superior authority, nor did I ever permit such a
thing, or if I had known of it would I have condoned such a
thing. . . .49
The testimony of Yokoyama supported this claim. He testified
that Yamashita never ordered the massacre of Filipinos and, in
fact, told him "to be fair in all [his] dealings with Filipino peo-
ple." 0 The defense's objective was to eliminate the element of
personal culpability from the prosecution's case. It attempted to
al Policy for Luzon Island, at 16).
46. This line of defense, not addressed in the commission's opinion, raises the
question of the extent to which military commanders may escape liability by simply
giving away command.
47. LAEL, supra note 11, at 86.
48. Id. at 87.
49. REEL, supra note 36, at 149-50.
50. 4 U.N. LAW REPORTS, supra note 25, at 21.
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show that, despite the vast number of atrocities, the daunting
conditions facing Yamashita rebutted the prosecution's claim
that he "must have" or "should have" known of them, i.e.,
Yamashita's claims of ignorance were not only plausible but
highly likely. Moreover, these acts were contrary to Yamashita's
stated orders.
After the close of arguments on 5 December 1945, it took the
commission less than forty-eight hours to find Yamashita guilty.
The following is considered by most legal scholars5 to be the
commission's definition of command responsibility:
Clearly, assignment to command military troops is accompa-
nied by broad authority and heavy responsibility. This has
been true in all armies throughout recorded history. It is
absurd, however, to consider a commander a murderer or
rapist because one of his soldiers commits a murder or a
rape. Nevertheless, where murder and rape and vicious,
revengeful actions are widespread offenses and there is no
effective attempt by a commander to discover and control
the criminal acts, such a commander may be held responsi-
ble, even criminally liable, for the lawless acts of his troops,
depending upon their nature and the circumstances sur-
rounding them.52
The commission also refused to accept Yamashita's claim of
ignorance noting that the prosecution succeeded in showing that
the crimes were "so extensive and widespread, both as to time
and area, that they must either have been wilfully permitted by
the accused, or secretly ordered by the accused."" The commis-
sion went on to state that "[c]aptured orders issued by subor-
dinate officers of the accused were presented as proof that they,
at least, ordered certain acts leading directly to exterminations
of civilians under the guise of eliminating the activities of guer-
rillas hostile to Japan. " '4 The commission also considered evi-
51. See, e.g., HOWARD S. LEVIE, TERRORISM IN WAR: THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES
158 (1993); LAEL, supra note 11, at 95; 2 THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HIsTO-
RY 1597 (Leon Friedman ed., 1972); REEL, supra note 36, at 171-72; Franklin A.
Hart, Yamashita, Nuremberg and Vietnam: Command Responsibility Reappraised, 62
U.S. NAVAL WAR C. INVL L. STUD. 397, 399-400 (1980).
52. 4 U.N. LAW REPORTS, supra note 25, at 35.
53. Id. at 34.
54. Id.
2031994]
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dence that Japanese forces had afforded the Geneva Convention
"scant compliance or attention."55
Concerning Yamashita's lack of troop inspections the commis-
sion was especially critical:
The Japanese Commanders testified that they did not make
personal inspections or independent checks during the Phil-
ippine campaign to determine for themselves the established
procedures by which their subordinates accomplish their
missions. Taken at full face value, the testimony indicates
that Japanese senior commanders operate in a vacuum,
almost in another world with respect to their troops, com-
pared with standards American Generals take for
granted.56
The commission then concluded:
(1) That a series of atrocities and other high crimes have
been committed by members of the Japanese armed forces
under [General Yamashita's] command against people of the
United States, their allies and dependencies throughout the
Philippine Islands; that they were not sporadic in nature
but in many cases were methodically supervised by Japa-
nese officers and non-commissioned officers; (2) That during
the period in question [General Yamashita] failed to provide
effective control of [his] troops as was required by the cir-
cumstances.57
A board of review, created by General MacArthur, evaluated
the commission's findings, issued its own opinion, and upheld
Yamashita's conviction.
C. In re Yamashita
The U.S. Supreme Court, in an opinion delivered by Justice
Stone, stated, inter alia, that the "gist of the charge" leveled
against Yamashita was for "unlawful breach of duty." 9 Thus,
55. Id.
56. Id. at 35.
57. Id.
58. Review of the Record, supra note 27, at 27.
59. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 14 (1946). The Court also addressed the legiti-
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the Court was concerned with whether an army commander is
duty bound to "take such appropriate measures as are within
his power to control the troops under his command"0 and
whether violations of the law of war that result from the com-
mander failing this duty attach to him personal responsibility.
The Court was impressed with the law of war's purpose "to
protect civilian populations and prisoners of war from brutali-
ty .... ," This purpose is defeated when an invading com-
mander is allowed to neglect with impunity the protection of
civilians and prisoners of war and, accordingly, "the law of war
presupposes that its violation is to be avoided through the con-
trol of the operations of war by commanders who are to some
extent responsible for their subordinates."6 2 The Court then
addressed with particularity the numerous conventions then ex-
isting which supported their conclusions.'
D. The Commission's Critics
Commentators, ever since December 1945, have argued over
the meaning of the commission's decision. Did the commission
believe from the evidence that Yamashita was in fact aware of
the atrocities or did the commission find guilt based on con-
structive knowledge? Or, in the alternative, was guilt based on
a theory of absolute liability-that a commander is per se re-
sponsible for every act committed by subordinate troops? This
discrepancy has led a number of commentators to criticize, and
subsequently mischaracterize, the commission's ruling.
macy of the military commission's authority to try Yamashita and the sufficiency of
the commission's evidence. The Court concluded that the order by General Styer to
establish the commission was lawful as it was sanctioned by Congress in the Articles
of War which allowed for "the creation of such tribunals for the trial of offenses
against the law of war committed by enemy combatants." Id. at 11. The Court then
ruled that the evidence used against Yamashita was not reviewable by the Supreme
Court. Yamashita claimed that the hearsay and opinion evidence violated Articles 25
and 38's prohibition against such evidence. Id. at 18. The Court rejected this argu-
ment, holding that Yamashita, as an enemy combatant, could not invoke Articles 25
and 38 as they were only intended to protect members of the United States Armed
Forces. Id. at 19.
60. Id. at 15.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
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Those that believe Yamashita was prosecuted on a theory of
absolute liability argue that because the evidence linking
Yamashita to the atrocities in their opinion was so weak, the
commission must have accepted Yamashita's claim of ignorance.
Frank Reel, one of Yamashita's defense counsel and out-spoken
critic of the commission, argues that "the condemnation was
unjust because Yamashita was held accountable for crimes
committed by persons other than himself, crimes committed
without his knowledge and, in fact, against his orders."'" Au-
thor Lawrence Taylor states that Yamashita was not "convicted
of ordering the atrocities ... or even knowing about them.
Quite simply, [Yamashita was] convicted on a theory of absolute
liability.. .- 65 Similarly, Telford Taylor, a U.S. prosecutor at
Nuremberg, argues that there was "no evidence that he knew of
[the atrocities] other than the inference that he must have
because of their extent.... 66 Dissenting Supreme Court Jus-
tice Frank Murphy agreed with these interpretations when he
stated that Yamashita "was not charged with personally partici-
pating in the acts of atrocity or with ordering or condoning
their commission. Not even knowledge of these crimes was
attributed to him."67
An analysis of the conclusions reached by the commission
and MacArthur's Board of Review reveal the fallacy of these
arguments. They demonstrate that the commission was im-
pressed by not only the volume of the atrocities, but also the
more direct evidence linking Yamashita to the crimes. While
acknowledging that the judgment never explicitly discussed
Yamashita's claim of ignorance, Franklin Hart points to a num-
ber of passages in the commission's decision which suggest
disbelief in Yamashita's assertions. 6' A reading of the
commission's findings on the captured orders and lack of inspec-
tions makes it "difficult to believe that the Military Commission
accepted Yamashita's protestations of ignorance."69 Passages
from the Board of Review's findings go even further in support
64. REEL, supra note 36, at 242.
65. TAYLOR, supra note 28, at 222.
66. TELFORD TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 182
(1970).
67. In Re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 28 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
68. Hart, supra note 51, at 400-01.
69. Id. See also LEVIE, supra note 51, at 159-62.
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of this position. The board was impressed by the systematic na-
ture of the atrocities and their:
striking similarity of pattern throughout.... Almost uni-
formly the atrocities were committed under the supervision
of officers or noncommissioned officers and in several in-
stances there was direct proof of statements by the Japa-
nese participants that they were acting pursuant to orders
of higher authorities, in a few cases Yamashita himself
being mentioned as the source of the order."0
Stating one basis for its decision, the board pronounced that
there existed a "deliberate plan of mass extermination which
must have emanated from higher authority or at least had its
approval."' Lastly, the board found that battle conditions in
the Philippines were "not so bad as stated by the accused." 2
These statements are inconsistent with those claiming the
commissions's decision was based on a theory of absolute liabili-
ty.
If the commission did not hold Yamashita to an absolute
liability standard, then the question remains as to what knowl-
edge standard was employed. The commission is unclear in its
judgment and commentators have been correct to question it for
this reason. 3 Some commentators have characterized the
commission's ruling as embracing the notion that Yamashita
either "must have known or at least should have known" of the
atrocities. '4 Any "must have known" language confuses the
subject as it clouds the line between "should have known" and
actual knowledge. This confusion has been the source for much
of the criticism of the commission's decision. The commission
may, however, be excused for its lack of precision since it was
breaking new legal ground in 1945 and the elements of com-
mand responsibility were not yet solidified.
For this reason, it is impossible to say with any degree of
certainty whether the commission was satisfied that because of
70. Review of the Record, supra note 27, at 15.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 16.
73. See Hart, supra note 51, at 400; LAEL, supra note 11, at 137-41.
74. See LAEL, supra note 11, at 141.
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Yamashita's position on the island and his proximity to the
atrocities he should have known of them or whether the com-
mission was satisfied that Yamashita had actual knowledge of
the atrocities.
The case against General Yamashita has been widely criti-
cized as the victor inflicting revenge on the vanquished. Many
commentators believe that Yamashita was held to too high a
standard given the surrounding circumstances. However, com-
mentators that adhere to this view fail to consider all the evi-
dence that was offered at trial. There were numerous witnesses
and captured documents introduced that contradicted
Yamashita's claims of ignorance. There was also substantial
testimony which allowed the commission to find that Yamashita
played a more direct role in the atrocities. Commentators may
disagree with the commission's factual interpretations of the
evidence but it is improper to mischaracterize its ruling as
embracing a doctrine of absolute liability for military command-
ers.
III. THE NUREMBERG TRIALS
Of the twelve trials conducted by the United States at the
Subsequent Nuremberg Proceedings,"6 two directly addressed
command responsibility. They were the High Command Case
and the Hostage Case. Both concerned, inter alia, illegal orders
which resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands and the
destruction of tremendous amounts of public and private prop-
erty. Those that believe Yamashita was held to too high a stan-
dard embrace these judgments because of their explicit rejection
of absolute commander responsibility and because of their more
realistic approach to the practicalities of war. While in neither
case were any of the defendants specifically charged with ne-
glecting their command responsibilities, the judgments handed
out against them addressed command responsibility and at-
tempted to redefine the knowledge component of the doctrine.
75. The U.S. trials at Nuremberg followed those held by the International Mili-
tary Tribunal which was responsible for the prosecution of the most notorious war
criminals such as Hess and Goering.
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In the High Command Case, the tribunal, comprised of U.S.
civilian judges, rejected the "should have known" standard.
Instead, before finding any commander responsible for the il-
legal actions of his subordinates the tribunal required sufficient
proof of actual knowledge. The commander's knowledge would
not be imputed.
The Hostage Case applied a different standard. That tribunal
embraced a "should have known" standard, albeit different from
the one that some commentators argue was applied in the
Yamashita case. This standard was not concerned with the
number of atrocities, but instead with the reports of them
which reached the commander's headquarters. In essence, the
tribunal held that if reports of the atrocities reached the
commander's headquarters then he should have knowledge of
them. Actual knowledge is not required.
A. The High Command Case
In 1947, the United States charged fourteen high ranking
German officers76 with waging aggressive war, participating in
the ill-treatment and murder of thousands of civilians, violating
the rights of prisoners of war, and conspiring to commit crimes
against peace and humanity.77 Pertinent to this discussion is
the judgment that was handed down against General Field
Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb. He commanded one of three Ger-
man armies on the eastern front between June 1941 and Janu-
ary 1942. The German eastern front focused on the invasion
and subsequent occupation of the Soviet Union. Specifically, von
Leeb was accused of implementing the illegal Commissar Order,
which called on German officers to kill captured Soviet political
officers accompanying troops in the field and the Barbarossa
76. General Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb, General Field Marshal Hugo
Sperrle, General Field Marshal George Karl Friedrich-Wilhelm von Kuechler, General
Johannes Blaskowitz, General Hermann Hoth, General Hans Reinhardt, General Hans
von Salmuth, General Karl Hollidt, Admiral Otto Schniewind, Lieutenant-General
Karl von Roques (Infantry), Lieutenant-General Hermann Reinecke (Infantry), Lieu-
tenant-General Walter Warlimont (Artillery), Lieutenant-General Otto Woehler (Infan-
try), and Lieutenant-General Rudolf Lehmann (Judge Advocate).
77. 12 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 2-5 (1949) [hereinafter 12
U.N. LAW REPORTS]. The facts which follow have been taken from the tribunal's
opinion.
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Order which denied prisoner of war status to, and resulted in
the murder of, captured Russian combatants.
Over the course of the war, the German Armed Forces were
controlled by the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht ("OKW). 78
Hitler was its supreme commander and through it, oversaw the
operation of each branch of the military. Directly subordinate to
Hitler in the OKW was General Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel.
Orders and military policy emanated directly from the OKW to
commanders in the field.
The OKW was divided into a number of different sections.
The Wehrmahctsfuehrungsstab (VFST") 9 directed all military
operations in the field. Command of the army rested with the
Oberkommando des Heeres ("OKH"), originally headed by Field-
Marshal Walter von Brauchitsch. He, however, was removed
when Hitler himself assumed the position in December 1941.
The German Army was divided into groups, each comprised of
two or more armies. Von Leeb commanded Army Group North.
On 30 March 1941, Hitler convened a military policy confer-
ence in Berlin. In attendance were members of the WFST and
other high ranking generals from the field, including von Leeb.
At this meeting Hitler iterated his aversion for communism and
his plans to destroy it."0 Also present at the meeting was Gen-
eral Franz Hadler whose notes reveal Hitler's intentions:
Clash of two ideologies. Crushing denunciation of Bolshe-
vism, identified with a social criminality. Communism is an
enormous danger for our future.... This is a war of exter-
mination .... We do not wage war to preserve the enemy.
War against Russia. Extermination of the Bolshevist
Commissars and the Communist intelligentsia .... Growth
of the new intellectual class must be prevented .... We
must fight against the poison of disintegration. This is no
job for military courts.
This war will be very different from the war in the West.
In the East, harshness today means leniency in the future.
78. For a detailed discussion of the German Armed Forces from the perspective of
a former general who served under Hitler, see WALTER WARLIMONT, INSIDE HITLER'S
HEADQUARTERS 1939-45 (R.H. Barry trans., 1962).
79. Often referred to as the Wehrmacht.
80. See 12 U.N. LAW REPORTS, supra note 77, at 23; see also WARLIMONT, supra
note 78, 160-61.
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Commanders must make the sacrifice of over coming their
personal scruples.81
The reaction of a number of generals present was negative.
They realized the brutality, as well as illegality, of Hitler's
intentions.82 Their opinions were expressed to Hitler through
Brauchitsch and Keitel, but to no avail. Consequently, on 6
June 1941, Hitler issued the Commissar Order through the
OKW. It read:
In the fight against Bolshevism it is not to be expected that
the enemy will act in accordance with the principles of
Humanity or of the International Law. In particular, a vin-
dictive, cruel and inhuman treatment of our prisoners must
be expected on the part of the political Commissars of all
types, as they are the actual leaders of the resistance.
The troops must realize:
(1) In this fight, leniency and consideration of Interna-
tional Law are out of place in dealing with these elements.
They constitute a danger for their own safety and the swift
pacification of the conquered territories.
(2) The originators of barbarous Asiatic methods of war-
fare are the political commissars. They must therefore be
dealt with most severely, at once and summarily.
Therefore, they are to be liquidated at once when taken
in combat or offering resistance.'
The order was directed to the three separate army groups
making up the eastern front. At trial, German officers testified
that at the beginning of the war, out of the approximately
220,000 Russian troops captured by the Germans, there must
have been roughly 2,000 to 2,500 commissars and of these only
96 were executed in accordance with the order." This figure,
however, is controverted as author Eugene Davidson contends
that several hundred were killed.85
On 13 May 1941, Keitel issued the "Decree on Exercising
Military Jurisdiction in the Area of Barbarossa and Special
81. 12 U.N. LAW REPORTS, supra note 77, at 23.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 24.
84. EUGENE DAVIDSON, THE TRIAL OF THE GERMANS, 567 (1966).
85. Id.
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Measures by the Troops," known as the "Barbarossa order."8
The order allowed German officers to summarily mete out pun-
ishment against civilians and franc-tireurs"7 suspected of acts
86. It read:
The Wehrmacht's application of its laws (Wehrmachtsgerichtsbarkeit)
place at maintaining discipline.
The vast extent of the operational areas in the East, the fighting
methods necessitated thereby and peculiarity of the enemy give the
Wehrmacht courts jobs which-in view of their limited personnel-they can
only solve during war operations and until some degree of pacification
has been obtained in the conquered area if they limit themselves at first
to their main task.
This is possible only if the troops themselves oppose ruthlessly any
threat from the enemy population.
For these reasons herewith the following is ordered for the area
'Barbarossa' (area of operations, army group rear area, and area of politi-
cal administration).
I
Treatment of Crimes committed by Enemy Civilians
(1) Until further order the military courts and the courts-martial
will not be competent for crimes committed by enemy civilians.
(2) Franc-tireurs will be liquidated ruthlessly by the troops in com-
bat or while fleeing.
(3) Also all other attacks by enemy civilians against the Armed
Forces, its members and auxiliaries will be suppressed on the spot by the
troops with the most rigorous methods until the assailants are finished.
(Niederkaempfen.)
II
Treatment of crimes committed against inhabitants by members of the
Wehrmacht and its auxiliaries
(1) With regard to offenses committed against enemy civilians by
members of the Wehrmacht or by its auxiliaries, prosecution is not obliga-
tory, even where the deed is at the same time a military crime or misde-
meanor.
(2) When judging such offenses, it will be taken into consideration
in any type of procedure that the collapse of Germany in 1918, the sub-
sequent sufferings of the German people and the fight against National
Socialism which cost the blood of innumerable followers of the movement
were caused primarily by bolshevist influence and that no German has
forgotten this fact.
III
Responsibility of the Troop Commanders
In so far as they are competent, it is the personal responsibility of
the troop commanders to see to it:
(1) that all officers of the units under their command are instruct-
ed in time and in the most emphatic manner about the principles set out
under T above;
12 U.N. LAW REPORTS, supra note 77, at 29-31.
87. The franc-tireurs were guerilla fighters that did not fall within the Hague
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directed against the German Army. More often than not, the
punishment was death. In a number of the army groups, the
order was viciously carried out.8" In addition, the order al-
lowed groups such as the Einsatzgruppen to murder thousands
of civilians with impunity.89
As did General Yamashita, General von Leeb put forward a
two-pronged defense. He claimed both that he was completely
unaware of the atrocities committed, and that they contradicted
his given orders. It is apparent that von Leeb disapproved of
the Commissar Order from the beginning. At the March meet-
ing von Leeb voiced his belief that Hitler's intentions were
illegal and contrary to conduct expected of soldiers. He asked
von Brauchitsch to persuade Hitler to change his plans. After
the Commissar Order was issued, evidence showed that von
Leeb considered the order to be a violation of international law
and again asked von Brauchitsch to persuade Hitler to rescind
it.9 Moreover, he discussed his opposition to the order with
his subordinates. He also used a Maintenance of Discipline
order to lessen, to the extent possible, the effect of the order:
lilt was clear from the evidence that the accused von Leeb had
protested against the order in every way short of open and
defiant refusal to obey it."9"
As for the Barbarossa Order, evidence established that "apart
from a mass liquidation which occurred at Kowno, no liquida-
tions within the accused von Leeb's area of command had been
brought to the attention of the accused."93 And when von Leeb
was made aware of the killings at Kowno, he immediately took
steps to prevent their repetition. Also, the evidence failed to
Convention of 1907's definition of legal combatants. Thus, Hitler felt no obligation to
treat them according to the mandates of the convention. See MATTHEW COOPER, THE
NAZI WAR AGAINST SOVIET PARTISANS 1941-44, 47-48 (1979).
88. See OMER BARTOv, THE EASTERN FRONT 1941-45, GEIMAN TROOPS AND THE
BARBARISATION OF WAR 119-29 (1986).
89. The Einsatzgruppen were paramilitary groups supported by the Germans.
Their mission was to exterminate "Jews, commissars, and other undesirables, as well
as [fight] the partisan bands that plagued the German rear areas." DAVIDSON, supra
note 84, at 316. In most instances, it was impossible to distinguish them from the
regular German Army. Id.
90. 12 U.N. LAW REPORTS, supra note 77, at 23.
91. Id. at 27.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 31.
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establish that von Leeb was aware of the activities of the
Einsatzgruppen. The record is also clear that von Leeb had not
been afraid to voice his opposition to the Fuhrer's plans on
other occasions; at the beginning of the war, von Leeb had
openly criticized Hitler's intentions to attack the low countries
and France.4
Of all the charges leveled against von Leeb the tribunal
found him guilty of one, implementing the 'Barbarossa Order,'
and for this he was sentenced to three years. In its judgment,
the tribunal first addressed warfare and the difficulties com-
manders face in knowing all the activities of subordinate troops:
Military subordination is a comprehensive but not conclu-
sive factor in fixing criminal responsibility. The authority,
both administrative and military, of a commander and his
criminal responsibility are related but by no means co-ex-
tensive. Modern war such as the last war, entails a large
measure of de-centralization. A high commander cannot
keep completely informed of the details of military opera-
tions of subordinates and most assuredly not of every ad-
ministrative measure.95
It then confronted command responsibility and stated that a
commander:
has the right to assume that details entrusted to responsi-
ble subordinates will be legally executed. The President of
the United States is Commander-in-Chief of its military
forces. Criminal acts committed by those forces cannot in
themselves be charged to him on the theory of subordina-
tion. The same is true of other high commanders in the
chain of command. Criminality does not attach to every
individual in this chain of command from that fact alone."
With this statement the tribunal moved away from the
Yamashita judgment. Where the Yamashita commission was
more willing to find knowledge from the surrounding circum-
stances, the High Command tribunal required substantially
more. In rejecting the notion that a military commander is "per
94. Id. at 13.
95. Id. at 76.
96. Id.
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se responsible within the area of his occupation"97 the tribunal
stated:
There must be a personal dereliction. That can occur only
where the act is directly traceable to him or where his
failure to properly supervise his subordinates constitutes
criminal negligence on his part. In the latter case it must
be a personal neglect amounting to a wanton, immoral
disregard of the action of his subordinates amounting to
acquiescence. Any other interpretation of International Law
would go far beyond the basic principles of criminal law as
known to civilized nations.98
The tribunal rejected the "should have known" standard.
Personal responsibility would not attach without some proof of
acquiescence. The fact that the atrocities occurred and that the
commander was in a position to know of them, but did not, was
not sufficient. As the tribunal pronounced, "the occupying com-
mander must have knowledge of these offenses and acquiesce or
participate or criminally neglect to interfere in their commission
and that the offenses committed must be patently criminal." "
On the question of whether the tribunal would impute knowl-
edge of the atrocities committed by the Einsatzgruppen to the
defendants, the tribunal noted that "it is apparent we can draw
no general presumption as to their knowledge in this matter
and must necessarily go to the evidence pertaining to the vari-
ous defendants to make a determination of this question."0 °
B. The Hostage Trial
The trial took its name from the German Army's practice of
taking hostages from the local populations of occupied countries
to insure against civilian attacks.'' Between September 1939
and May 1945, German soldiers in the countries of Albania,
Greece, Norway, and Yugoslavia murdered and enslaved hun-
dreds of thousands of civilians. The Germans' purported aim
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 77.
100. Id. at 79.
101. The Hostage Case is reported in detail in 8 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR
CRIAINALS, 34 (1949) [hereinafter 8 U.N. LAW REPORTS].
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was to eliminate the destructive guerilla forces as was seen in
the Yamashita and High Command cases. There were also
charges that the German Army wantonly destroyed both public
and private property for no legitimate military purpose. It was
alleged that the soldiers responsible for the atrocities were
acting "pursuant to orders issued, distributed and executed" by
high-ranking German officers.102 The indictment against these
officers charged that they "participated in a deliberate scheme
of terrorism and intimidation wholly unwarranted and unjusti-
fied by military necessity ... , The indictment carried the
following four counts:
(1) That defendants were principals or accessories to the
murder of hundreds of thousands of persons from the civil-
ian population of Greece, Yugoslavia and Albania by troops
of the German Armed Forces....
(2) That defendants were principals or accessories to the
plundering and looting of public and private property, the
wanton destruction of cities, towns and villages, frequently
together with the murder of the inhabitants thereof...
(3) That defendants were principals or accessories to the
drafting, distribution and execution of illegal orders....
(4) That defendants were principals or accessories to the
murder, torture, and systematic terrorisation, imprisonment
in concentration camps, forced labour on military installa-
tions, and deportation to slave labour, of the civilian popu-
lations of Greece, Yugoslavia and Albania .... 104
Germane to this discussion is the prosecution of General
Field Marshal Wilhelm List. He commanded the German Army
during the invasion and subsequent occupation of the Balkan
peninsula. Soon after occupation began, attacks on German
soldiers by civilian insurgent forces in Yugoslavia and Greece
threatened German military stability. In response, on 16 Sep-
tember 1941, Hitler ordered List to suppress the insurgent
movement and assigned General Franz Boehme to assist him.
Boehme, while remaining subordinate to List, was given the
102. Indicted were Wilhelm List, Maximilian von Weichs, Lothar Rendulic, Walter
Kuntze, Hermann Foertsch, Franz Boehme, Helmuth Felmy, Hubert Lanz, Ernst
Dehner, Ernst von Leyster, Wilhelm Sediel, and Kurt von Geitner.
103. 8 U.N. LAW REPORTs, supra note 101, at 35.
104. Id. at 35-36.
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"entire executive power" in Serbia."5 In October of that year,
Boehme issued his plans for the suppression of the insurgents.
He wanted all males in Serbia suspected of being communists
arrested as hostages and if German soldiers were killed the
"commanders [were] to decree the shooting of arrestees accord-
ing to the following quotas: (a) For each killed or murdered
German soldier... one hundred prisoners or hostages, (b) For
each wounded German soldier ... 50 prisoners or hostag-
es. "10 6 On 16 September 1941, the OKW issued a similar order
which List distributed to his subordinates.' 7 List issued his
own order in October:
The male population of the territories to be mopped up of
bandits is to be handled according to the following points of
view:
Men who take part in combat are to be judged
by court martial.
Men in the insurgent territories who were not
encountered in battle, are to be examined and-
If a former participation in combat can be
proven of them to be judged by court martial.
If they are only suspected of having taken part
in combat, of having offered the bandits support
of any sort, or of having acted against the
105. Id. at 39.
106. Id.
107. It read:
Measures taken up to now to counteract this general communist
insurgent movement have proven themselves to be inadequate. The Fuh-
rer now has ordered that severest means are to be employed in order to
break down this movement in the shortest time possible. Only in this
manner, which has always been applied successfully in the history of the
extension of power of great peoples can quiet be restored.
The following directives are to be applied here: (a) Each incident of
insurrection against the German Wehrmacht, regardless of individual
circumstances, must be assumed to be of communist origin. (b) In order
to stop these intrigues at their inception, severest measures are to be
applied immediately at the first appearance, in order to demonstrate the
authority of the occupying power, and in order to prevent further prog-
ress. One must keep in mind that a human life frequently counts for
naught in the affected countries and a deterring effect can only be
achieved by unusual severity. In such a case the death penalty for 50 to
100 communists must in general be deemed appropriate as retaliation for
the life of a German soldier. ...
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Wehrmacht in any way, to be held in a special
collecting camp. They are to serve as hostages in
the event that bandits appear, or anything
against the Wehrmacht is undertaken in the
territory mopped up or in their home localities,
and in such cases they are to be shot.'l8
In Serbia, troops under General Boebme's command acted in
accordance with his order and a considerable number of civil-
ians were killed." 9 List, like Yamashita and von Leeb, pro-
fessed complete ignorance of the atrocities. However, in the
town of Topola, Boehme executed .approximately 2,000 villagers
suspected of being Jews or communists in retaliation for twen-
ty-two German soldiers killed. Evidence at trial established that
List was made aware of these killings in a communication from
Boheme. The communication read: "Execution by shooting of
about 2,000 Communists and Jews in reprisal for 22 [German
soldiers] murdered... . "' There was also evidence that List
was made aware of other atrocities carried out in accordance
with the hostage orders. However, List "never himself signed an
order for the killing of hostages or other inhabitants, or fixed a
ratio determining the number of persons to be put to death for
each German soldier killed. .. , In addition, a number of
the murders that were carried out in List's area of command
were committed by units of the S.S. not directly under his
command."'
The judgment of the tribunal found that it is the "duty of the
commanding general in occupied territory to maintain peace
and order, punish crime and protect lives and property. This
duty extends not only to the inhabitants of the occupied territo-
ry but to his own troops and auxiliaries as well.""' The tribu-
nal noted that "[those responsible for such crimes by ordering
or authorizing their commission, or by a failure to take effective
steps to prevent their execution or recurrence must be held to
108. Id. at 39-40.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 69.
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account if International Law is to be anything more than an
ethical code, barren of any practical coercive deterrent.
" 114
Rejecting List's claims of ignorance, the tribunal was im-
pressed that List was told by subordinates of the reports of the
murders by units in the field. The tribunal held that a com-
mander "is charged with notice of occurrences taking place
within that territory.... If he fails to require and obtain com-
plete information, the dereliction of duty rests upon him and he
is in no position to plead his own dereliction as a defense.""'
This statement appears to embrace a "should have known"
standard. However, it is not the "should have known" standard
as it was purportedly applied in the Yamashita case. It was not
the number of atrocities which the court recognized as imputing
knowledge, but rather the reports which found their way to his
headquarters. As the tribunal noted:
The reports made to the defendant List as Wehrmacht
Commander Southeast charge him with notice of the unlaw-
ful killing of thousands of innocent people in reprisal for
acts of unknown members of the population who were not
lawfully subject to such punishment.116
C. Nuremberg Concluded
With its decision, the Hostage tribunal moved away from the
High Command's application of the doctrine of command re-
sponsibility. It rejected the stringent requirement that nothing
short of actual knowledge would suffice. The Hostage tribunal
accomplished this by redefining the "should have known" stan-
dard.
If word of the atrocities being committed by subordinate
troops reach the commanders via reports filed with headquar-
ters then the commanders should be aware of them and they
will be legally recognized as having received them. After imput-
ing knowledge, the tribunal then found that List did not punish
those responsible for the atrocities and, further, took no steps
114. Id. at 70.
115. Id. at 71.
116. Id.
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to prevent their repetition. Accordingly, it concluded that List's
"failure to terminate these unlawful killings and to take ade-
quate steps to prevent their recurrence, constitutes a serious
breach of duty and imposes criminal responsibility."
11 7
There must be some means by which the commander is able,
if he is fulfilling his responsibilities as a commander, to learn
of the atrocities. Black's Law Dictionary defines imputed knowl-
edge as "knowledge attributed or charged to a person because
the facts in question were open to his discovery and it was his
duty to inform himself as to them.""' This new "should have
known" standard will become increasingly more important when
command responsibility is applied to the situation in the former
Yugoslavia.
IV. COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY SINCE NUREMBERG
A. The My Lai Massacre
In 1971, United States Captain Ernest Medina was brought
before a military court to answer charges that three years pri-
or, during the Vietnam conflict, he failed to adequately control
the men of his company."' In 1968, in the hamlet of My Lai
the men of Medina's company slaughtered hundreds of unarmed
civilians-the majority of whom were women, children, and old
men. The massacre afforded the United States the opportunity
to prosecute one of its own military commanders for failing to
control the actions of his men. Again, the central question was
to what standard of knowledge would the military tribunal hold
the commander. In 1969, Lieutenant General Williams R. Peers
was directed to explore the events surrounding the assault on
My Lai and determine if any cover-up had taken place. His
findings are reported in The Peers Report."0
Charlie Company arrived in Vietnam in early December
1967. In January 1968, it was assigned to Task Force Bark-
117. Id.
118. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 758 (6th ed. 1990).
119. Captain Medina commanded Charlie Company, 1st Division, Second Infantry.
120. The scope of the inquiry included a thorough investigation of the atrocities.
For a complete transcript see JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE MY LAI MASSACRE AND
ITS COVER-UP: BEYOND THE REACH OF LAW? 29-395 (1976).
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er.12' The task force was created for the purpose of applying
pressure on the Quang Ngai Province in South Vietnam, a
traditional Viet Cong stronghold. In March, Medina was or-
dered to assault the My Lai 4 hamlet which was suspected of
harboring hundreds of soldiers from the experienced 48th Viet
Cong Battalion.
On the morning of 16 March, Charlie Company was flown by
helicopter to within a few hundred yards of the hamlet.'
With a population of only several hundred the hamlet was com-
prised of thatched huts and small brick homes.2 ' Three pla-
toons were engaged in the assault. The company believed this
was the first real contact it was going to have with the Viet
Cong. 4 However, upon entering the hamlet, the company
took no enemy fire and encountered no resistance. Later, it was
thought that the Viet Cong had simply moved out of the hamlet
before the U.S. soldiers arrived, tipped off by the shelling com-
menced just before the assault.'
"The killings began without warning.""6 Harry Stanley, a
member of the company, recalled witnessing:
some old women and some little children-fifteen or twenty
of them-in a group around a temple where some incense
was burning. They were kneeling and crying and praying,
and various soldiers... walked by and executed these
women and children by shooting them in the head with
their rifles." 7
Eighty more were pulled from their homes, huddled together
and executed. The killings continued all morning. Dennis Conti,
also a member of Charlie Company, explained what he thought
happened:
121. Id. at 81.
122. See id. at 100-02.
123. SEYMOUR M. HERSH, MY LAI 4: A REPORT ON THE MASSACRE AND ITS AFTER-
MATH 47 (1970).
124. The company had been on a number of search-and-destroy missions but it had
never fully encountered an enemy contingency of considerable size.
125. HERSCH, supra note 123, at 46.
126. Id. at 49.
127. Id. at 49-50.
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We were all psyched up, and as a result, when we got there
the shooting started, almost as a chain reaction. The major-
ity of us had expected to meet VC combat troops, but this
did not turn out to be so. First we saw a few men run-
ning... and the next thing I knew we were shooting at
everything. Everybody was just firing. After they got in the
village, I guess you could say that the men were out of con-
trol.12
The Peers Report estimated that the number killed "was at
least 175 and may exceed 400."129
As the commanding officer of Charlie Company, Captain
Medina was charged with responsibility for the massacre be-
cause of his "continuing duty to control the activities of his
subordinates where such activities were being carried out as
part of an assigned military mission .. .1"o Presiding over
the trial was military judge, Colonel Kenneth Howard.13' Spe-
cifically, the prosecution alleged that Medina was "in and about
the village of My Lai (4)" and in constant radio contact with his
platoons throughout the operation.12 The prosecution also con-
tended that at some point in the operation Medina "became
aware that his men were improperly killing non-combat-
ants.""3' Lastly, the prosecution claimed that after becoming
aware of these acts, Medina "declined to exercise his command
responsibility by not taking necessary and reasonable steps to
cause his troops to cease the killing of non-combatants."'3 4
Medina, however, argued that he was not aware of the atroci-
ties committed by his men until it was too late. He contended
that he remained with his command post west of the village.
He stated that it was his belief that at the time of the assault
all the women and children of the village would be out of the
hamlet and on their way to market. In addition, as soon as he
128. Id. at 51.
129. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 120, at 314.
130. 2 THE LAW OF WAR, supra note 51, at 1731.
131. Two colonels, two lieutenant colonels, and one major adjudged the general
court martial.
132. 2 THE LAW OF WAR, supra note 51, at 1731.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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became aware of the killings, Medina testified that he ordered
an immediate cease fire.
135
Pertinent to this discussion is Colonel Howard's charge to the
court. On the issue of command responsibility Howard gave the
following instruction:
a commander is also responsible if he has actual knowledge
that troops or other persons subject to his control are in the
process of committing or are about to commit a war crime
and he wrongfully fails to take the necessary and reason-
able steps to insure compliance with the law of war. You
will observe that these legal requirements placed upon a
commander require actual knowledge plus a wrongful fail-
ure to act.
Howard then proceeded to discuss how proximity to the atroc-
ities impacts on the doctrine.
Thus mere presence at the scene without knowledge will
not suffice. That is, the commander-subordinate relationship
alone will not allow an inference of knowledge. While it is
not necessary that a commander actually see an atrocity
being committed, it is essential that he know that his sub-
ordinates are in the process of committing atrocities or are
about to commit atrocities."36
As was seen in the High Command Case, there would be no
imputing of knowledge. Not surprisingly, Medina was found not
guilty.
Colonel Howard's interpretation of command responsibility,
however, was not consistent with the U.S. Army manual, The
Law of Land Warfare. It notes that:
when troops commit massacres and atrocities against the
civilian population of occupied territory or against prisoners
of war, the responsibility may rest not only with the actual
perpetrators but also with the commander. Such a respon-
sibility arises directly when the acts in question have been
committed in pursuance of an order of the commander con-
135. Id.
136. Id.
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cerned. The commander is also responsible if he has actual
knowledge, or should have knowledge, through reports re-
ceived by him or through other means, that troops or other
persons subject to his control are about to commit or have
committed a war crime and he fails to take the necessary
and reasonable steps to insure compliance with the law of
war or to punish violators thereof."'
A number of commentators have criticized Colonel Howard
because of the appearance that since Medina was a U.S. soldier
a different set of rules was applied. By applying the High Com-
mand Case precedent instead of the Hostage Case precedent,
Colonel Howard virtually guaranteed Medina's acquittal. Many
criticize Howard for apparently holding a member of his own
army to a lesser standard than that applied to General
Yamashita. Those that defend Colonel Howard point to studies
conducted at the time which undermine the principles by which
war criminals were judged at the end of Second World War.
Many studies support the notion that a number of complex
factors work to transform otherwise decent people into
murderers.'
B. The 1977 Protocol
In 1977, a field of international delegates amended the 1949
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949' and, for the first
time, specifically addressed the doctrine of command re-
sponsibility.'40 Once again, the question of knowledge was de-
bated. Clearly, it would not be absolute liability; that notion,
following Yamashita, was categorically rejected by all subse-
quent trials dealing with the issue. Would the amendment
contain a "should have known" standard like the one possibly
applied in the Yamashita case or like the one in the Hostage
Case? Or would the conferencees reject all "should have known"
137. LAEL, supra note 11, at 127-28 (quoting THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE (FM-27-
10) 178-79 (Government Printing Office 1956) (a U.S. Army Field Manual)) (emphasis
added).
138. These factors include: the death of close comrades, continuous shelling and
constant contact with the enemy. See LAEL, supra note 11, at 132-33.
139. See supra note 10.
140. The conference's work is reprinted in its entirety in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977).
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logic and require actual knowledge? Or would the conference
allow for some combination of the different positions?
The conference opted for the Hostage Case precedent. Two
proposed amendments, one sponsored by the U.S. delegation to
the conference, were rejected because of their overly broad
"should have known" language. The first stated that military
commanders would be responsible for the illegal acts of a subor-
dinate "if they knew or should have known that he was com-
mitting or would commit such a breach and if they did not take
measures within their power to prevent or repress the
breach."' This logic is consistent with the Yamashita deci-
sion. Knowledge would be imputed from surrounding circum-
stances and the position of the accused. Similarly, the rejected
U.S. proposal provided that responsibility would attach "if [the
military commanders] knew or should reasonably have known
in the circumstances at the time that [a subordinate] was com-
mitting or was going to commit such a breach.... "" This al-
so reflects too broad a proposition as again knowledge could be
satisfied even in the absence of any evidence which would place
the accused in a position where he could have learned of the
atrocities. The amendment which was finally codified read:
The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Proto-
col was committed by a subordinate does not absolve his
superiors from penal or disciplinary responsibility, as the
case may be, if they knew, or had information which should
have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the
time, that he was committing or was going to commit such
a breach and if they did not take all feasible measures
within their power to prevent or repress the breach.'
The similarities between this amendment and the judgment
in the Hostage Case are readily apparent. The tribunal in that
141. HOWARD LEVIE, PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS: PROTOCOL 1 TO THE 1949 GE-
NEVA CONVENTIONS, 4 voLs. (1979-81).
142. Id.
143. DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICT:
Text of Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relat-
ing to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I) adopted by
the conference on June 8 1977, art. 86, n.2, 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1429 (1977). See also,
art. 87.
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case charged notice of the atrocities because of the reports that
crossed von Leeb's desk. Accordingly, the amendment states
that commanders will be charged with notice if they "had infor-
mation which should have enabled them to conclude"' that
atrocities were committed. However, while both reject the no-
tion that only actual knowledge will suffice, the Hostage Case
standard and the 1977 Protocol are open to two strikingly dif-
ferent interpretations. The former, imputing knowledge from
"reports made to the commander" arguably requires proof of a
careful record-keeping general staff archiving incriminating
documents. The latter can be read to permit the introduction of
widely published press accounts of the atrocities. This distinc-
tion will become extremely important to the discussion of com-
mand responsibility in the former Yugoslavia.
The 1977 conference chose the Hostage standard over the
others because of its fairness. Actual knowledge, as was seen in
the High Command Case and the My Lai court martial, pres-
ents a standard nearly impossible to meet. It requires that
prosecutors prove awareness. Certainly, the commander is not
going to admit to knowledge. Moreover, the only persons that
would be in a position to know for certain whether the com-
mander had knowledge are his immediate subordinates. Cer-
tainly, they will not be quick to implicate their commanding
officer. All these factors make proving knowledge extremely
difficult, if not impossible. Therefore, a more realistic approach
is to impute knowledge where the commander was in a position
to know of the atrocities.
V. YUGOSLAVIA
A. Factual Background
The atrocities occurring in the former Yugoslavia easily rival
those committed during the Second World War by soldiers of
the 14th Area Army in the Philippines and the soldiers of the
German Army in Russia and on the Balkan peninsula. The
Bosnian government has gathered evidence of forty-two alleged
mass murders and at least twenty mass graves.'45 The govern-
144. Id. (emphasis added).
145. Leonard Doyle, Germans Hold Serb 'War Criminal' Former Restaurant Owner
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ments of Serbia and Croatia claim similar numbers. In Septem-
ber of last year, it was widely reported that the conflict in the
former Yugoslavia had claimed 200,000 lives and left another
two million homeless.46 There are innumerable stories of
murder, torture, rape, and mutilation. Often, the victims are
civilian women and children. There also exist hundreds of de-
tention camps where a substantial number of the atrocities are
being committed.47
Cherif Bassiouni, former chairperson of the United Nations
Commission on War Crimes in the former Yugoslavia, had a
staff of fifty working to catalog all of the reports.'48 The com-
mission was set up to collect and analyze evidence of the atroci-
ties.' Pursuant to Article 11 of the Statute5 eleven judges,
each from a different country, were elected by the General
Assembly in September to hear the cases. Jurists were chosen
from Australia, Canada, China, Costa Rica, France, Italy, Ma-
laysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and the United States. 5' In August
Charged With Taking Part in Genocide Against Bosnian Muslims, THE INDEPENDENT,
Feb. 15, 1994, European News Page, at 8.
146. See Retreating Army Leaves Area Devastated, CALGARY HERALD, Sept. 18,
1993, at A12; Researchers to Document Bosnian War Crimes, THE LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 1, 1993, at 27; Nightline (ABC television broadcast, Aug. 5,
1993). The most recent reports say the number killed is approaching 250,000. NBC
Nightly News (NBC television broadcast, Feb. 20, 1993).
147. The United Nations Commission on War Crimes has listed 393 such camps.
Researchers to Document Bosnian War Crimes, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 1,
1993, at 27. Survivors of these camps report seeing "men beaten to death, shot in the
back, and burned alive." Alan Elsner, U.S. Says 70,000 May Be Held in Yugoslav
Camps, REUTERS LTD., Jan. 6, 1993. There are allegations of mass executions and
torture. Id. It is also reported that men are being forced to sodomize their sons and
watch their daughters raped. See Researchers to Document Bosnian War Crimes, THE
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 1, 1993, at 27.
148. Flynn McRoberts, At De Paul, War is Waged Against Balkan Atrocities, CHI.
TRiB., Nov. 21, 1993, at C1.
149. The commission's other members are Christine Cleiren, a criminal law profes-
sor from the Netherlands, Sophie Greve, a court of appeals judge from Norway, Keba
Mbaye, a former World Court judge from Sengal, and William Fenrick, a Canadian
expert on war crimes. See Anthony Goodman, Venezuelan Prosecutor Gets Key U.N.
War Crimes Post, THE REUTER EUR. Bus. REP., Oct. 21, 1993.
150. Report of the Secretary-General supra note 3, at 1177-78.
151. They include Antonio Cassese, a former professor of international law at Flor-
ence University and former chairman of a number of European Human Rights com-
mittees. He was elected president of the Tribunal in late November. Elected vice-
president was Elizabeth Odio Benito, Costa Rica's minister of justice. The other mem-
bers of the tribunal are Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, a federal judge in Texas; Michel
Abi-Saab, an Egyptian law professor; Rustam Sidwha, a former Pakistani Supreme
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of 1994, Richard Goldstone, a South African judge, was named
chief prosecutor. As of the beginning of February 1995,
Goldstone had already brought one indictment against a Serbi-
an detention camp commander and was promising more.'52 It
is reported that Goldstone anticipates the trials beginning by
late March or early April of this year.'53 There should not be
any shortages of suspects. As of April 1993, the United Nations
War Crimes Commission, then headed by Polish Prime Minister
Tadeusz Mazowiecki, had a list of more than 1,000 sus-
pects.' Those listed include Serbian President Slobodan
Milosevic, and the leader of the Bosnian-Serbs Radovan
Karadzic as well as his military chief General Ratko
Mladic.'55 Also pegged are Manojlo Milovanovic, commander of
the Serb Army in Eastern Bosnia, and General Milan Gvero, a
Serbian political officer accused of masterminding the policy of
"ethnic cleansing." "' In addition, there are numerous lower-
ranking officers that have been identified. One is the notorious
warlord Xelko Rashatoric who commands an 800-man Serbian
paramilitary unit.'57 He is a former ice cream salesman
known to his followers as Arkan and is accused of murdering
hundreds of Bosnians and Croats and playing a role in the
ethnic cleansing. Other reports cite camp commanders and their
assistants as being responsible for a large number of the atroci-
ties. 15
Court judge; Jules Deschenes, former chairperson of a commission to find former
World War II war criminals living in Canada; Li Haopei, an advisor to China's For-
eign Ministry; Lal Chand Vohrah, a senior high court judge from Malaysia; Sir
Ninian Stephen, a former governor-general of Australia; Adolphus Godwin Karibi-
Whyte, a Nigerian Supreme Court justice; and Claude Jorda from France, replacing
Le Foyer de Costil who asked to step down. Australian May Become U.N. War
Crimes Prosecutor, REUTERS, Jan. 28, 1994.
152. Wilbur G. Landrey, The Search for Justice in Bosnia is a Difficult One, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 20, 1995, at 2A.
153. Id.
154. Adrian Lithgow, Generals of Genocide; 'Nuremberg' War Crimes Trials for Serb
Army Chiefs, ASSOC. NEWSPAPERS LTD., Apr. 18, 1993, at 1.
155. United Nations: Eight Judges for War Crimes Court Elected, INTER PRESS SER-
VICE, Sept. 16, 1993.
156. Lithgow, supra note 154.
157. See Catherine Field, Ice-cream Man Becomes Warlord; Arkan Talks Democracy
But His Mood is Aggressive, THE GAZETTE (Montreal), Jan. 2, 1993, at A12.
158. See Paul Lewis, U.S. Aide Sees Nations Hindering Balkan Tribunal, THE N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 18, 1994, at A10.
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B. Command Responsibility in Yugoslavia
Paragraph 3 of Article 7 of the Statute provides:
The fact that any [illegal acts were] committed by a
subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal respon-
sibility if he knew or had reason to know that the subordi-
nate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the
superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable mea-
sures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators
thereof."9
As the debate over command responsibility has focused on the
essential question of knowledge, an interpretation of "had rea-
son to know" becomes crucial. On its face, the language of the
statute appears to accord with the 1977 Protocol which requires
that commanders "knew, or had information which should have
enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the time" that
atrocities were being or were about to be committed. Both the
Statute and the protocol apply a liberal standard which will
impute knowledge if the commander was in a position to learn
of illegal acts committed by subordinates.
However, one could argue the Statute's "had reason to know"
is merely a reversion to the pure "should have known" stan-
dard. In other words, the United Nations Tribunal could satisfy
the knowledge requirement by simply establishing that a vast
number of atrocities were committed.
A reading of the United States' proposal to Secretary-General
could provide a resolution to these two conflicting interpreta-
tions. 60 Boutros-Ghali, in drawing up the Statute was re-
quired to consider "suggestions put forward... by Member
states." 6' The U.S. proposal on command responsibility pro-
vided that:
An accused person is also individually responsible if he or
she had actual knowledge, or had reason to know, through
159. Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 3 (emphasis added).
160. See U.S. proposal, art. 11(b) at 5 (on file with the University of Richmond
Law Review) [hereinafter U.S. Proposal].
161. S.C. Res. 808, supra note 1, at para. 2.
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reports to the accused person or through other means, that
troops or other persons subject to his or her control were
about to commit or had committed such violations, and the
accused person failed to take necessary and reasonable
steps to prevent such violations or to punish those commit-
ting such violations." 2
The Statute apparently adopted the proposal almost verbatim.
The changes incorporated are relatively insignificant. The lan-
guage in the U.S. proposal, "through reports to the accused
person", reflects a standard similar to the one applied in the
Hostage case and the "through other means" expands the U.S.
proposal to the extent permitted by the 1977 protocol. However,
Boutros-Ghali perhaps recognizing the redundancy of the phrase
excised it from the Statute leaving only the more encompassing
liberal standard "had reason to know." The U.S. proposal lends
credible evidence to an interpretation of Article 7, paragraph 3
which encompasses both the 1977 Protocol and the ruling in
the Hostage Case.
Concerning the Statute's applicability to suspects in the for-
mer Yugoslavia, it is clear that knowledge sufficient for the
doctrine has already been admitted to by a number of the mili-
tary commanders. Due to the extensive news coverage of the
conflict, many foreign journalists have been playing the role of
messenger. Unlike the Japanese and German generals at the
end of the Second World War, commanders in the Balkan con-
flict such as Radovan Karadzic, have been interviewed by the
foreign press and those interviews have been recorded.6 3 In a
number of instances, they are admitting knowledge of the atroc-
ities and their control over the troops. Given the liberal stan-
dard adopted by Article 7, paragraph 3 of the Statute, the pros-
ecution should be able to use these admissions to prove the
knowledge component in a command responsibility prosecution.
The following is an exchange that occurred between Sam
Donaldson and Karadzic on Nightline:
162. U.S. proposal, art. 11(b) at 5 (emphasis added).
163. See generally This Week With David Brinkley (ABC television broadcast, Mar.
21, 1993) [hereinafter Brinkley].
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Sam Donaldson: Why, sir, are your forces shelling
Srebrenica? Why are they shelling Sarajevo? Why are they
killing women and children and old men, and why are there
snipers killing people, including international journalists?
Mr Karadzic: Well, concerning these questions, as well as
ethnic cleansing, I will tell you official figures of Interna-
tional Red Cross, there are many more Serbian refugees
than Muslim and Croatian together."
Statements such as these made to Karadzic and other leaders
establish the knowledge element essential for a prima facie case
sufficient to charge those leaders under the command respon-
sibility doctrine.'65
Karadzic has also made other incriminating statements to the
foreign press. Over a year ago he dismissed allegations of atroc-
ities noting that "there weren't even enough Serbian soldiers
inside Bosnia to perpetrate these deeds on such a scale."16 -
Further, in response to a rebellion by Serbian troops, it was
164. Nightline (ABC television broadcast, Mar. 21, 1993) (transcript on file with
the University of Richmond Law Review) [hereinafter Nightline].
165. Additionally, Karadzic on at least two occasions acknowledged that he controls
the soldiers committing these acts. In the following excerpt from the 21 March
Nightline interview the Bosnian-Serb leader did not refute Donaldson's claims that
Karadzic controls the troops.
Donaldson: Well, what about my question, sir? Why are you shelling
those two towns I mentioned?
Karadzic: Well, I will-
Donaldson: Why are you killing those people?
Karadzie: If you allow me, rl tell you. Many more Serbs have been
killed by Muslim snipers than Muslims by Serbian shells.
Id. Moreover, in an interview with David Brinkley, Karadzic, citing the differences
between himself and Adolf Hitler, admitted that control of the Bosnian-Serb army is
centralized.
Brinkley- What is the difference between what you have been doing there
and Adolf Hitler?
Karadzic: Well, it's hard to say. We have unified command for the army,
[and] for the police....
Brinkley, supra note 163. Also, Mladic, Bosnian Serb Commander, admitted that the
Serbian army is controlled by a central command. He stated, "Now, more or less, we
control everything. But if somebody attack [sic] us we may lose unified command and
control and there's going to be chaos with more killing, and more destruction." World
News Tonight (ABC television broadcast, May 6, 1993) (transcript on file with the
University of Richmond Law Review).
166. Bill Schiller, Bosnians Recall Horror of Rape by Serb Troops, THE TORONTO
STAR, Jan. 4, 1993, at Al.
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reported that Karadzic promised officers that if they returned
they would not be punished for their roles in war crimes.'
This statement is clearly violative of the Statute's mandate
which requires that commanders "punish perpetrators" of war
crimes. It was also reported that Arkan also denies any role in
the war crimes and dismisses threats that he will be put on
trial.
168
VI. CONCLUSION
The history of command liability for the war crimes of subor-
dinates varies according to the proof of knowledge of the illegal
acts that is required by the tribunal passing judgment. Since
the inception of the doctrine in 1945, each prosecution has
turned on this issue. The commission in the case of General
Yamashita failed to state explicitly its requisites for knowledge.
The tribunal in the High Command Case applied a very strict
standard requiring proof of actual knowledge. The tribunal in
the Hostage Case moved away from stringently requiring actual
knowledge and applied a "should have known" standard. If
reports of atrocities reach the commanders' headquarters then
they will be charged with knowledge.
The court martial of Captain Medina reverted back to the
strict standard of the High Command tribunal. Finally, the
1977 Protocol focused the discussion and codified a standard
similar to that applied by the tribunal in the Hostage Case.
Where the Protocol differs, however, is in its liberal standard
allowing knowledge to be proven where commanders "had infor-
mation which should have enabled them to conclude" that sub-
ordinates were committing atrocities. The Statute of the Inter-
national Tribunal has followed this lead. It holds that the
knowledge requirement may be satisfied if the commander
knew or had reason to know of the atrocities.
The list of persons yet to be indicted should be long. As those
indictments are handed down, many should be charged with
failing their commander responsibilities as some of the persons
167. U.N. Names 11 to War Crimes Panel; Serbian Leader Says Peace Plan Near,
THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Sept. 18, 1993, at A24.
168. Field, supra note 157.
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already accused of war crimes have made statements which
show that as commanders of soldiers they are not fulfilling
their responsibilities as required by international law.
Christopher N. Crowe



